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Models are a flourishing and indispensable area of research in language evolution. Here we 
highlight critical issues in using and interpreting models, and suggest viable approaches. First, 
contrasting models can explain the same data and similar modelling techniques can lead to 
diverging conclusions. This should act as a reminder to use the extreme malleability of 
modelling parsimoniously when interpreting results. Second, quantitative techniques similar to 
those used in modelling language evolution have proven themselves inadequate in other 
disciplines. Cross-disciplinary fertilization is crucial to avoid mistakes which have previously 
occurred in other areas. Finally, experimental validation is necessary both to sharpen models' 
hypotheses, and to support their conclusions. Our belief is that models should be interpreted as 
quantitative demonstrations of logical possibilities, rather than as direct sources of evidence. 
Only an integration of theoretical principles, quantitative proofs and empirical validation can 
allow research in the evolution of language to progress.  
1 Introduction 
It is clear that modelling has gained in importance in studies of language evolution. 
For example, at the latest International Conference on the Evolution of Language 
(Evolang IX), from a total of 83 talks, 19 (23%) reported results from quantitative 
models. These models make hypotheses about events in the past that are no longer 
observable, and explore whether these premises could lead to conclusions 
compatible with the current state of matters. They are, therefore, often able to give 
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  insights into the potential stages and mechanisms involved in the emergence of 
language. For instance, computer models have played an important role in 
demonstrating that cultural transmission, in the absence of strong biological 
constraints, can be seen as a plausible mechanism leading to language universals 
(Kirby, 2001). Quantitative models also generally require greater “clarity and rigor” 
(Hurford, 2002) than non-quantitative theorizing and “enforce explicitness in the 
formulation of an explanation”  (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003).  
Despite the potential benefits of using quantitative tools to model language 
evolution, there are important pitfalls that can arise from taking models as direct 
evidence to support or refute specific theoretical frameworks. This practice has 
generated an unwarranted confidence that modelling can provide data similar in 
quality to experimental work (Cangelosi & Parisi, 2001). In this paper, we argue that 
this is a dangerous conclusion. With examples from recent literature, we show how 
different scenarios rendering different conclusions can be coherently modelled, 
without an obvious procedure to assess which one better approximates the reality it 
is built to simulate. We think models should only be used as an intermediate step 
between theory and experiments. Given this, we examine the role of empirical data 
in justifying these models.  
2 The Problem of Diversity 
One of the potential problems of treating models as equivalent to empirical tools is 
that too far a range of situations can be plausibly modelled. For instance, consider 
the debate regarding the relative weight of biological and cultural evolution in 
shaping language structure. Some models have suggested that the distribution of 
different languages in a population reflects the (innate) priors of individual agents 
(Burkett & Griffiths, 2010; Griffiths & Kalish, 2007). Other models propose instead 
that weak innate biases are sufficient for languages to become established in 
populations, since mechanisms of cultural transmission have the power to amplify 
weak biases (Kirby, Dowman, & Griffiths, 2007; Smith, 2009). One important 
assumption of these models is how, given a set of different hypotheses\languages, 
agents select which hypothesis\language better explains the utterances they are 
exposed to. The role of innate biases seems to be emphasized when agents are 
assumed to choose a language proportionally to its probability in the posterior 
hypothesis space; and the effects of innate biases are minimized when agents are 
assumed to choose disproportionally more often the language with the highest 
probability in the hypothesis space. As Smith (2009) points out, “the true nature of 
human hypothesis selection strategy is ultimately an empirical question”. This 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of different models (Burkett & 
Griffiths, 2010; Griffiths & Kalish, 2007; Kirby et al., 2007; Smith, 2009) which 
have different assumptions and support contrasting conclusions about language 
evolution.  
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  The broader problem is that the same mathematics can be used to argue from 
opposite theoretical views, such as the idea of an innate universal grammar and the 
notion of a pure cultural evolution of language (Griffiths, Kalish, & Lewandowsky, 
2008; Nowak, Komarova, & Niyogi, 2001). Furthermore, models with completely 
different mechanistic principles can generate very similar outputs. For instance, both 
the principles and parameters and the iterated learning frameworks can be used to 
agree with the same data in historical linguistics (Niyogi & Berwick, 1997; Reali & 
Griffiths, 2009). 
Further examples of model flexibility abounded during Evolang IX. While 
Baronchelli et al. (2012) argue that cultural change is too fast for biological 
evolution to play a role in the structure of languages, McCrohon (2012) 
demonstrates that some aspects of language resistant to change may be targets of 
biological evolution. This diversity of scenarios would not be problematic, if the 
models were taken as demonstrations of logical possibilities instead of direct sources 
of evidence.  Unfortunately, statements from the conference proceedings suggest 
more than the mere demonstration of logical possibilities: "Cultural transmission 
renders the biological evolution of strong domain-specific innate constraints 
unlikely" (Thompson, Smith, & Kirby, 2012); "Only adaptations for flexible 
learning combined with continual cultural evolution can reconcile the diversity of 
languages, with the biological uniformity of their speakers" (Baronchelli, Chater, 
Pastor-Satorras, & Christiansen, 2012); "duality of pattern emerges as a consequence 
of pure cultural dynamics" (Tria, Galantucci, & Loreto, 2012).  
We are aware that modelling research in all disciplines usually draws 
conclusions under the tacit assumption that these are only valid within the theoretical 
scope of a specific modelling framework. However, given the particularly 
multidisciplinary readership of language evolution research, the connection between 
model results and empirical reality should always be stated. Given that several 
alternative scenarios can be all coherently modelled, there is a fundamental problem 
in assessing which model among the many provides a better description of the 
mechanisms involved in language evolution. This assessment is impossible without 
external instruments of validation.  
3 Model Validation 
There are two general ways to assess the validity of quantitative models. A first, 
obvious method is the comparison of the model outcomes with the reality it 
exemplifies. Whenever a model is inconsistent with observable facts, then a 
reformulation of the model is necessary. For instance, if a certain model attempts to 
simulate the establishment of conventionalized communication systems, then the 
failure to do so generally argues against its validity. This method of validation is not, 
however without pitfalls. As mentioned above, both the principles and parameters 
and the iterated learning frameworks can be used to fit the same historical data. 
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  Moreover, the problem of using only historical data is further demonstrated by other 
disciplines such as social sciences and economics, where models built to fit past data 
failed to predict future outcomes. Such failures render these models poor 
approximations of reality and reflect the disregard of important variables, the 
reliance on false assumptions or the impossibility to adequately describe a complex 
system with few minimalistic equations. 
A second method to assess the validity of models is to check whether 
assumptions and selected parameters hold against empirical inquiry. For example, in 
classical (normative) microeconomics, agents (humans) are assumed to be rational 
decision-makers. Research in psychology has proven this assumption wrong 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Recent models on iterated decision-making (Camerer, 
Ho, & Chong, 2004) do incorporate these assumptions of irrationality and cognitive 
limitations, fitting well both empirical evidence on processes’ outcomes and, 
crucially, mechanistic constraints leading to such outcomes. 
3.1 Examples from Social Sciences 
There is a basic, widespread family of models that can be found, explicitly or tacitly 
used, both in the language evolution literature and in the social sciences. Both areas 
engage themselves in the hard task of modelling and predicting states of complex 
systems characterized by a number of unobservable variables. Markov models, in all 
their simplicity and flavours, are a building block of applied mathematics. Simplicity 
and elegance are a tacit, golden rule of modelling. However, these come at a cost: 
few parameters can, if any, only capture the most basic forces in a complex system. 
It is therefore important for modellers to always keep in mind this essentiality vs. 
depth of scope trade-off when interpreting model results. Moreover, the failure of a 
model to predict an event in another discipline should instigate caution in drawing 
inferences on the evolution of language using a closely related modelling technique. 
An interesting example of this is a modelling study by Schrodt (2000) 
investigating conflict patterns in the former Yugoslavia war. The panel data consist 
of weekly reports about the magnitude of the conflict (low vs. high) over a period of 
8 years. Two hidden Markov models are created, corresponding to low and high 
conflict magnitudes. Independent variables include several possible predictors of 
conflict (ranging, for instance, from demonstrations to ethnic expulsions). The 
goodness of the model is then evaluated as the ability of a time pattern of events to 
be attributed to - therefore explained by the model of - high or low conflict periods. 
The results suffer from an issue common to such models: accuracy (how well an 
outcome is predicted), sensitivity (how uncertainty propagates from assumptions to 
results) and precision (variability in replicated forecasts) of the model have to be 
traded for one another. Here, for instance, 80% accuracy corresponds to 25% 
sensitivity and 60% precision, while a model with 92% short-run (near future) 
accuracy has only 30% precision. The forecasting horizon emerges as a fourth 
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  parameter in assessing the goodness of Schrodt's model. This is extremely common 
in any model containing a time component: the closer in time the prediction, the 
higher its reliability. Results on forecasting horizon from other disciplines appear 
particularly relevant to language evolution research: Language models deal with 
time spans which are several orders of magnitude greater that the critical time 
horizons in the social sciences. 
As another parallel, it is interesting to mention what Cowles (1932) reports on 
the ability of economic models to forecast future market developments, notably at a 
time when mathematical economics was starting to develop. Cowles, an advocate of 
mathematical accuracy in economics, reviews 45 different attempts at predicting 
stock markets, made by just as many prestigious agencies and financial publications. 
He compares these forecasts to null statistics achievable by pure chance and finds 
little difference between these two ways of predicting unknown events. "The most 
successful records are little, if any, better than what might be expected to result from 
pure chance. There is some evidence, on the other hand, to indicate that the least 
successful records are worse than what could reasonably be attributed to chance." 
(Cowles, 1932) 
Twelve years later, as modelling techniques advance, Cowles (1944) finds 
evidence of some predictability in stock prices. He claims that "A simple application 
of the "inertia" principle, such as buying at turning points in the market after prices 
for a month averaged higher, and selling after they average lower, than for the 
previous month, would have resulted in substantial gains for the period under 
consideration”. Paraphrasing, a Markov process with three states and one month lag 
was better than chance in suggesting fruitful investments. These simple models have 
since then been replaced by more complex ones, which became the standard college-
level tuition in finance and whose basic assumptions were in turn criticized down to 
the bone (Hudson & Mandelbrot, 2004). What happened to stock market forecasting 
is already history. 
Our point is that if a specific technique used in modelling language has 
demonstrated lack of robustness or predictive power when used in other disciplines, 
researchers should be cautious in interpreting the result of their model. To make 
matters worse, language evolution models are designed to predict only past, rather 
than future events. Hence, if different evolution models fit the historical data equally 
well, it may be impossible to refute these models based on their outcome. This 
renders the selection and validation of a priori assumptions even more fundamental. 
Within the field of language evolution, this empirical validation comes from 
historical linguistics, psychology, biology and demographics. In the next section we 
will discuss a paradigmatic example of this interaction between models and 
empirical data: the iterated learning model. 
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  3.2 Iterated Learning Model 
The “iterated learning model” (Kirby, 2001) involves a meaning space, a signal 
space, a learner and a teacher. At each step of the model, the teacher agent produces 
a string. The learner tries to construct the most parsimonious mapping between 
meaning and symbols. It has been observed that there is a gradual regularization of 
this mapping over many steps of the model. The iterated learning model has been 
linked to two distinct sets of empirical tests.  
The first source of empirical evidence supporting the iterated learning model 
comes from psychological experiments, in which people are asked to make signal-
object associations (Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008). The experiments show 
evidence of compositionality emerging spontaneously in an artificial language after 
a few iterations of cultural transmission, an outcome similar to previous simulation 
results. These experiments are important to demonstrate that language-specific 
features can emerge from cultural mechanisms (without the need of language-
specific biological adaptations). However, they do not constitute a strong proof that 
evolution of language occurred due to these mechanisms alone. One reason to be 
cautious about these inferential jumps is raised by Littauer (2012): "Early language 
communities may have had different pressures on linguistic evolution and 
morphological complexity than modern languages, including differences in the 
amount of shared information. (…) Agreement is an integral part of language 
evolution, and the origin of agreement in protolanguage may not have followed the 
same paths as modern agreement formation processes". In fact, the psychological 
experiments conducted to validate the model of iterated learning were performed on 
modern humans, while pre-linguistic hominids may have had different cognitive 
skills and biases. With this setup, one can investigate mechanisms of cultural 
transmission under the cognitive biases that are characteristic of modern humans, but 
one cannot assess whether the evolution of these biases in the hominin lineage might 
have changed the compositional features of our communication signals.  
Still within experimental psychology, we can find other reasons warning against 
straightforward conclusions: When horizontal transmission (intra-generation) is 
included along with vertical transmission (inter-generation), the scenario of cultural 
evolution becomes more complex (Berdicevskis, 2012; Tamariz, Cornish, Smith, 
Roberts, & Kirby, 2012). For example, the need to negotiate meaning with 
conspecifics in horizontal transmission leads to low fidelity in vertical transmission 
(Berdicevskis, 2012), even in a scenario of a highly structured language (contra 
(Kirby et al., 2008). 
The second source of evidence comes from historical linguistics. Recently, 
Reali and Griffiths (2009) showed that three distinct language features can be 
explained by a neutral iterated learning model. These include the characteristics of 
verb regularization, Zipf's law and the character of innovations in language. The 
authors propose that neutral models should be used as null models for language 
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  dynamics. Their opinion is that if neutral models can be used to explain a particular 
characteristic of languages, then there is no need to appeal to selective forces. 
Recently, Blythe (2011) also justified that neutral models qualify as good null 
models for language dynamics. While this agreement of theory and data from 
historical linguistics might be both interesting and useful, the data is unfortunately 
over a time scale much smaller than that of language evolution. Since the evolution 
of the faculty of language refers to a period of time that goes back at least up to the 
last common ancestor between humans and chimpanzees, its (cognitive, ecological, 
cultural, etc.) context differs from that of the evolution of languages (object of 
concern for historical linguistics). Naturally, the theoretical model cannot be 
extrapolated to a different time scale and a different set of conditions.  
4 Better Evaluation Techniques and Better Models 
We think models can be useful if there are better common practices in their 
evaluation and validation. There is, however, the danger that modelling research will 
go towards increasingly complex models that rely on an increasing number of 
plausible hypotheses which rely on the intuition of the modeller. It is important to 
instead focus on identifying and limiting the hypotheses within these models and 
look for ways of testing them. As pointed out, a crucial method to evaluate models is 
to check whether both their assumptions and mechanistic constraints are supported 
by independent experimental research. This applies to a variety of assumptions 
usually only scrutinized by plausibility analyses. For instance, we should test how 
humans select hypotheses before assuming a particular strategy (Smith, 2009); and 
we should test whether humans display irrational biases or cognitive limitations on 
certain tasks before assuming they will behave as rational agents in processes 
involving those tasks (Camerer et al., 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). If it turns 
out that human behaviour departs from rationality, realistic models should 
incorporate these constraints. 
An important point for modelling language evolution is the question of what 
biological/cognitive evolution means, and how it can be encoded in models. The 
evolution of language is the product of both biological and cultural evolution. The 
weight of each of these processes in shaping language structure is currently 
unknown. However, modelling discrete stages of biological evolution requires the 
incorporation of discrete cognitive constraints present in the populations evolving. 
For instance, while humans can encode hierarchical information in vocal utterances, 
it is unlikely that cats do so, even though both species can communicate vocally. It is 
unlikely that successive generations of cats communicating vocally will develop a 
hierarchical system of communication, even if this communication strategy would 
be the most efficient. A realistic model of evolution of vocal communication, from 
the last common ancestor between humans and cats up to the modern human, would 
need to somehow encode these cognitive constraints, and the evolution of these 
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constraints across successive generations of agents (Jones & Love, 2011). Cues 
about the processes underlying the evolution of these cognitive constraints can be 
obtained using a comparative approach, in which different species are 
experimentally tested in similar cognitive tasks, with the goal of identifying the 
cognitive constraints of each. Though it might be impractical to include such fine-
grained information, perhaps some general law of ‘cognitive evolution’ will emerge 
from the comparative approach. This law could be incorporated in future models of 
language evolution. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have suggested how a large variety of scenarios can be coherently 
modelled. Since different scenarios are achieved by selecting different parameters 
and assumptions, this selection process should be rigorously scrutinized. We have 
shown that leaving fundamental parameters out of models may bias the conclusions 
in order to meet previous theoretical assumptions. If computer simulations are taken 
as direct evidence to support particular theories over others, then there is a danger of 
the scientific process becoming circular. The role of experimental work is 
fundamental to validate both models’ results and assumptions. Finally, we note that 
it is not enough to check models against empirical data, but also to examine the 
relevance of this agreement to language evolution. Data relevant to the evolution of 
languages is not necessarily relevant to the evolution of the faculty of language. A 
wider range of validation techniques will be required. 
We see quantitative modelling as an intermediate step between theory and 
experiment. It helps improve on theory by clarifying assumptions, adding insights 
and showing the plausibility or processes. It can help analyze available data and lead 
us to new sources of empirical evidence. It is then a worthwhile endeavour as long 
as it continues to interact with experiments and data. If the results of these models 
are carefully interpreted, they could play an important role in our understanding of 
language evolution. 
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